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T 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
F. EPHRAIM BATES and 
MAE P. BATES, I 
Def end ants and Appellants. [ 
) 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10910 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein Plaintiff claims a right of 
eminent domain in the construction of a highway and a stock 
trail and in the taking, Defendants' access to water on Silver 
!'reek was cut off. Defendants claim that Plaintiff has the 
obligation to furnish them access to water or pay additional 
compensation therefore. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court, and the Court granted 
judgment of $35.00 per acre on 8.71 acres of Defendants' 
land by reason of the stock trail construction, but found that 
the agreement between the agent of Plaintiff and the Defen-
dants as to water, watering rights, or compensation there-
fore was not binding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants and Appelants seek a reversal of the trial 
court's finding and judgment that the agreement made with 
Defendants by the agent of Plaintiff was not binding, and 
that Plaintiff should either provide water or pay compen-
sation to Defendants for not doing so in accordance with the 
evidence presented. Further, that the trial court should make 
additional findings and judgment to conform to the evidence 
and facts proved. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the fall of 1959, Mr. Alden S. Adams, an agent of the 
State Road Commission of Utah, contacted defendants in 
Wanship, Utah, concerning the State Highway Project pro-
posed in that area which would affect defendants' land and 
access to water on Silver Creek. 
Over the years defendants had watered their cattle and 
sheep on the Silver Creek stream in the area where Silver 
.... 
Creek crosses the corner of section 26, (see exhibit D-10) 
and a!Jout 3,000 acres of defendants' land to the north and 
'.\'est of that watering area were used by these cattle and 
sheep from that stock watering source (TR 12). 
Defendants' property extends north and west up a fair-
ly steep slope from Silver Creek to a ridge involving about 
:3,000 acres. Then north, beyond the ridge, on the other side 
of the mountain, defendants' land includes another approxi-
mate 4,000 acres, and this side of the mountain is served by 
another stream for stock water purposes. 
When defendants discovered that plaintiff's highway 
project would cut off their access to Silver Creek and would 
affect their use of some 3,000 acres of land, they were vitally 
concerned and "water" became the major issue in their dis-
cussion with Plaintiff and its agents. 
On several of these discussions with Mr. Alden Adams 
and a Mr. Stahle, defendants received assurances that the 
state would provide them with water (TR 15, 16) and it was 
further discussed the possibility or feasibility of the state's 
acquisition or exchange of lands with others so that defend-
ants could get access to water (TR 17). 
On January 7, 1960, defendants received a letter from 
Mr. Alden S. Adams, the agent for plaintiff ref erring to the 
Settlement of the water problems ancl exchange of land (ex-
hibit D-8 and TR 17). Then on February 2, 1960, defendants 
received right of way contracts, deeds, and settlement in-
roices in relation to the taking by plaintiff of defendants' 
land, and attached to, and as a part of these contracts, was 
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a letter addressed to defendant, Fay E. Bates, and signed by 
Alden S. Adams, as agent, wherein defendants were request. 
ed to sign the documents, and further that they would b'· 
furnished water. It reads as follows: ' 
"Relative to the water situation, we do not have 
title as yet. The state is endeavoring to make a deal 
with your neighbors for some landlocked land which 
includes water, which we plan to develop for the land 
owners, including yourself. At that time a supple. 
mental contract will have to be executed." (Exhibit 
D-7 and TR 18). 
Defendants thereupon signed the documents and re. 
ceived $8,664.00 for the land taken and damages, but no-
where did the documents ref er to the cutting off of defend-
ants' water as part of the damages, and at no time did the 
agents for plaintiff discuss with defendants that the dam-
ages they were being paid for included their being cut off 
from their water. (TR-19) 
Thereafter, defendants continually met with agents of 
the plaintiff, both at their offices and out on the property 
concerning How the water would be furnished defendants, 
each year since 1960 and sometimes several times during a 
year (TR-21) until the time of trial in February 1967 
(TR-30). 
In the fall of 1966, Mr. Kenneth Hisatake, attorney for 
Plaintiff, had conversations and discussions with Gaylen S. 
Young, Jr., counsel for Defendants, concerning a settlement 
of the issues between the clients, and the real issue of 11,rfrr 
was discussed, and how the state was going to furnish it to 
r 
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Defendants, as had been agreed and promised. The state en-
gineers indicated they could build a water trough and pump 
the \rater up through a pipe from Silver Creek, inasmuch as 
their efforts to obtain water from Mr. Bertagnole's spring 
and other sources had not worked out ( TR-38). Defendants, 
thereupon met with Mr. Hisatake, one of the state engineers, 
and Mr. Young out on the property to discuss further the 
fea:;1bility of a pump situation. Defendants were concerned 
11 hether a gasoline driven pump placed on the hillside would 
be practical and feasible, thus they followed the suggestion 
made of obtaining an engineer to make a study and obtain a 
report on how best to secure the water. Mr. Wayne D. 
Criddle, an engineer and expert in the field of water, and 
formerly having spent eight years as the state engineer, 
was hired by Defendants for this purpose. 
i\lr. Criddle came up with three alternate methods of 
supplying water to Defendants for their cattle and sheep, as 
well as the cost of each, and this he testified to at the trial 
(TR-44-49). 
Thus, the fact of the continuous discussions, promises, 
and actions on the part of Plaintiff and their agents in the 
furnishing of water to Defendants was shown not only by 
the testimony of l\ir. Fay Bates and the letters of Alden S. 
Adams, agent but it was corroborated by the testimony of 
Mac Bates, ( TR-32) John Bates, (TR-31, 32) and Gaylen 
Young, ( TR-38, 39). Furthermore, Plaintiffs' witnesses, Mr. 
HisatakP and Mr. Wheadon, substantially corroborated the 
fad of the continuous recognition by the Plaintiff and its 
agentK to furnish water to Defendants and their efforts to 
du .;o ( TR-6, 7, 8, 35). 
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About two days prior to trial, counsel for Plaintill 
notified counsel for Defendants that the state would not 
furnish water to Defendants, nor would they pay compen~a 
tion for not doing so ( TR-30). Thus, counsel for Defendanb 
asked for a special pre-trial conference to determine the 
issues at the trial. The court, at that hearing, suggested 1;, 
Defendants that if they would repay the State Roa<l Corn. 
mission $8,664.00 together with interest thereon since Feb. 
ruary 2, 1960, at 6% per annum, it would consider starting 
all over on the issue of damages in the original taking anrl 
the water issue could be determined with it. 
Defendants could not come up with that amount of cash, 
and it was finally determined that, along with the isiue of 
damages for the land taken from Defendants by Plaintiff 
in the construction of the stock trail, the issue of whether 1 
the state should be required to furnish water to Defendants, 
or pay compensation for not doing so, would be heard. 
Then after hearing the evidence presented on February 
20, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment that the 
agreement made by Alden S. Adams was not binding on 
Plaintiff and that Defendants were not entitled to further 
compensation (R-23). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PURPORTED AGREEMENT MADE BY ALDEN S. 
7 
ADAMS WAS NOT BINDING AND THAT THE DE-
PENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY FURTHER 
COMPENSATION. 
From the very beginning of contacts made with De-
fendants by Plaintiff and their agents regarding the high-
way project proposed and the taking of land, the question of 
1raler and the furnishing of water was the paramount issue 
and of most concern to Defendants. 
Mr. Fay Bates, Defendant, testified that the first con-
tact by the State Highway Department was made in 1959 
dnd his testimony is as follows: (TR-14-15) 
A. "Well, the first contact that I had was from a Mr. 
Alden Adams who was acting as right-of-way 
purchasing agent for the state of Utah." 
Q. "I see." 
A. "And we discussed, of course the new project, and 
what implications there was and that there was 
in fact to be a non-access fence on both sides of 
the canyon to control livestock and other things, 
and, of course, on the initial encounter with Mr. 
Adams we discussed the various ways, or effects 
that this would have upon the landowners, and, 
of course, paramount and immediate and prob-
ably basic to all other things was the use or 
access to water by stock which was to be grazed 
on this area." 
Q. "Was anything said by Mr. Adams on this occa-
sion?" 
A. "Yes." 
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Q. "What was said?" 
A. "Mr. Adams assured me the state would provirle 
water." 
Q. "Even though they took your water access in thi~ 
area from you?" 
A. "They would provide me with water regardless o! 
what else they did, they would provide me with 
water. That was the basic issue." 
Defendant Bates further testified that he had about 
four or five conversations with Mr. Adams and others prior 
to February 2, 1960 and on each of those occasions it was 
represented that the state would provide Defendant with 
water (TR-16). 
On January 7, 1960 Defendant, Bates, received some 
documents attached to a letter from Alden S. Adams, right-
of-way agent (Exhibit D-8). The letter states as follows: 
"Attached, hereto, please find right-of-way en· 
try agreement, in triplicate, giving the Road Com· 
mission permission to enter up your property needed 
for the construction of the above project. 
Messers Arnold Shields and Leo Bertagnole have 
given the Road Commission a right of entry due to 
the fact that the closing of the right-of-way contracts 
cannot be made until after the water problems awl 
exchange of land has been settled. 
r 
i 
We are wondering if you would execute the right 
of entry since the information you request regardin.g 
your neighbors is not yet decided. If you agree to thI' 
kindly execute two copies of the agreement and r~ 1 
turn to this office." 
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Effort was made by the state to make an exchange and 
lo acquire certain land as a source of water for Defendants 
(TR-17). 
Then again on February 2, 1960 the following docu-
ment was received from Alden S. Adams, directed to De-
fendant, Fay E. Bates (Exhibit D-7) : 
"Attached, hereto, please find right-of-way con-
tracts, deeds, and right-of-way settlement invoices 
covering parcels No. 49 :B, 56, 47 :A, 51 :A, 51-E, 
and 56 :A of the above project. 
Will you kindly sign the papers and also have 
your wife sign the same. Your signatures on the in-
voices and deeds will have to be notarized. 
Please note that we have protected you on the 
only fence where will be any problem on. All of the 
other fences are solid NA fence, no access. 
Relative to the water situation, we do not have 
title as yet. The state is endeavoring to make a deal 
with your neighbors for some landlocked land which 
includes water, which we plan to develop for the 
landowners, including ,yourself. At that time a sup-
plemental contract will have to be executed." 
Defendants therefore signed the deeds and contracts 
and received a certain amount of money, but nowhere was 
there reference to the fact that the money received was also 
for the taking of their water source, but to the contrary, 
Defendants continued to expect the state to furnish them 
another water source, and the Plaintiff and its agents con-
tinued to lead Defendants to believe that they were honestly 
i1ying to do that. 
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Defendant, Fay Bates, further testified of these fact.~"' 
follows: (TR 19-21) 
Q. "Since February 2, 1960, what efforts, if am 
have you made to get this water situatin;1 
solved?" 
A. "I have met with the State Highway Purcha~ing 
Right of Way Department down there on several 
occasions. On one specific occasion I recall mi, 
wife and I went down there to discuss this with 
Mr. Adams : " 
Q. "This was after February 2, 1960 ?" 
A. "Yes, and we were informed-we did talk to Mr. 
Adams briefly but, Mr. Adams informed us that 
he had other business that he must take care of, 
but mainly that he, in fact, had been taken off 
of this project and that there had been another 
man attached to this particular project in the 
right-of-way purchasing department, and he re· 
ferred us to a Mr. Williams who we talked to at 
that time." 
THE COURT-"Clarence Williams?" 
THE WITNESS-"! believe that was the name." 
Q. "To discuss this water situation?" 
A. "Yes. We did discuss it with Mr. Williams, and 
he, of course, did not have a solution to it. He 
was apprized of the situation. We told him that 
we were desirous of getting a settlement, and. he 
again told us that the state was trying to effed 
a satisfactory settlement and that they would 
continue to do so. 
"""' I 
I 
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THE COURT: "To get you water?" 
THE WITNESS: "To get us water, and further on 
several other occasions when we discussed the 
thing we were told that we would be supplied 
with water." 
Q. "Did they come out to your property on definite 
occasions for discussions with you concerning 
this?" 
A. "There were various men, various men in the de-
partment that we discussed this with besides 
Mr. Stahle and Mr. Adams." 
Q. "Well, did they - - " 
A. "We discussed the situation with Mr. Hepworth 
also, who was the project engineer." 
Q. "Did any of them at any time say they were not 
going to provide you with water?" 
A. ''No. It wasn't said they weren't, but only - -" 
Q. "How?" 
A. "How the water was to be supplied, and not a 
question of whether it would be or could be." 
Q. "Did they go to some effort to try and locate an-
other spring of water for you?" 
A. "We discussed the possibility of a natural spring 
that was on other land." 
Q. "Was that Mr. Bertagnole's land?" 
A. "That was Mr. Bertagnole's land, and we dis-
cussed the possibilities and feasibilities of devel-
12 
oping it, and at one other time as to whether thi 
would develop, how it could be done that wa'. 
satisfactory." · 
Q. "Have you been discussing, under the taking and 
their statement, the possibility of providing vou 
with water ever since 1960 then?" · 
A. "Yes, we have." 
Q. "Some time each year since 1960, without stop!" 
A. "Yes, often several times during a year." 
Counsel for Defendants, Gaylen S. Young, Jr., testified 
also at the trial of the further efforts on the part of the state 
to furnish Defendants with water and the fact of their rec. 
ognizing an actual obligation to furnish water. Mr. Young's 
testimony is as follows: (TR-38) 
"It is my testimony that a few days following Oc-
tober 20, 1966, after receiving a letter from Mr. 
Kenneth Hisatake, attorney for the Plaintiff, that I 
informed him of the question of water being the real 
issue in this case and the furnishing of Mr. Bates 
water on his land. 
"Mr. Hisatake told me that he would contact the 
Engineer's office, or those from the State Road Com· 
mission who had the information, and let me know 
later. It was a few days later that I had a call from 
Mr. Kenneth Hisatake in which he informed me that 
he had discussed the matter with agents from the 
State Road Commission and that Mr. Bates was, in 
fact, entitled to water, that they had agreed tofu~­
nish him with water, and that they were making el· 
forts to provide him with that water but so far th~s: 
efforts had not materialized in obtaining a spnnb 
from Mr. Bertagnole or from other sources, but that 
the state would be able to build a pump and a water-
ing trough and that it would be necessary for us to 
go out to the property of Mr. Bates to see exactly 
what that would be like in order to provide him with 
water." 
The testmony of Mae Bates and John Bates was also the 
r;arne as Defendant Fay Bates as to these facts, (TR 31-32). 
Furt.hermore, Plaintiff did not dispute these things and the 
evidence presented, but relied merely on the position that the 
Plaintiff was not bound, under the law, to perform regard-
less of its promises or agreements to furnish water to 
Defendants. 
For the state to take this position, after leading De-
fendants on for over six years that they were to receive a 
supplemental contract on water rights and that they were 
actually making effort to develop another water source, is 
~imply manifestly unjust, inequitable, and we believe con-
trary to the law. 
Had Defendants realized that the state did not intend 
to honor its commitments to them, they could have refused to 
sign the original contracts and deeds and obtained relief 
through the courts for the loss of about 3,000 acres of land 
by reason of their loss of water, and which Defendants be-
lieve is far in excess of the $8,664.00 received by them for 
the land. taken originally. However, to compel Defendants to 
return the money received, after these many years, with in-
t~rest as was suggested by the trial court at the pre-trial 
conference, places them at a great disadvantage. 
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Furthermore, as the letter of Alden S. Adams of Feb. 
ruary 2, 1960 was attached to and made a part of the docu. 1 
ments sent out, the reference to the plan to dei-elop and fi:r 
nish water for Def enrlants and the intent to enter intn 
11 
supplemental contract, constitutes a "condition subsequent'' 
and the Plaintiff's failure and refusal to abide by this ~ondi. 
tion amounts to a breach and failure to pay, which in at-
cordance with 78-34-14 of Utah code annotated 1953 entitles 
the Defendants to the restoration of possession of their 
property and an annulment of the entire proceedings. 
The Plaintiff can furnish a source of water to Defend-
dants, though, if they will just do so, as was outlined in 3 
alternate methods by Mr. Criddle, Engineer, at the trial 
(TR 44-49), and the state should be bound by their promises 
and agreements to do it. 
In 43 Am. Jur. 71, Section 254 it states: 
"When power or jurisdiction is delegated to any 
public officer over a subject matter, and its exercise 
is confided to his discretion, the acts done in the ex-
ercise of the authority are, in general, binding and 
valid as to the subject matter." 
Mr. Alden Adams, right-of-way agent, was given power 
or jurisdiction to negotiate with Defendants on their land. 
and we submit that he had discretion to deal on the basis of 
furnishing water. However, not only did Alden Adams a'· 
sure Defendants of providing water, but others in the right-
of-way department gave these assurances over a six year 
period (TR 16, 19-21, 38), and if the state claims that Ad· 
ams did not have authority to deal with Defendants on 
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water, the further promises and actions of the other officers 
au<l agents of Plaintiff certainly constitute a ratification and 
validation of Alden Adams' actions. See 42 Am. Jur. 319, 
Section 27: 
"Acts of administrative authorities unauthor-
ized at the time may become valid and binding by 
ratification ... " 
The question arises then, whether Alden Adams, as a 
public officer, was in fact acting within the scope of his 
authority in dealing with Defendants on the issue of water, 
so that the principles of agency should apply. We submit that 
he was acting within the scope of his authority even though 
not specifically directed or requested to do so by his superior. 
See 43 Am. Jur. 85, Section 273, wherein it states: 
"In order that acts may be done within the scope 
of official authority, it is not necessary that they be 
prescribed by statute, or even that they be specifical-
ly directed or requested by a superior officer, but it 
is sufficient if they are done by an officer in relation 
to matters committed by law to his control or super-
vision, or that they have more or less connection with 
such matters . .. " 
Now at the trial of these issues, Plaintiff made no 
showing whatsoever of any lack of authority on the part of 
Plaintiff's agents to deal with Defendants on the furnishing 
of water except that after both sides had rested their case, 
and ;1 days later at the time set for argument, and over the 
objections made by counsel for Defendants, testimony was 
heard from Mr. Anthony Rudelich touching on the authority 
nf Alden S. Adams, only. We submit to this court that it was 
lG 
error for the trial court to allow in the record the testimony 
of Mr. Hudelich, after both sides had rested their case. Upon 
stipulation of the parties, counsel for Plaintiff had agreed 
to try and get Mr. Alden S. Adams into court at the time of 
argument to be examined by counsel for Defendants, for the 
state had agreed to have him present previously at the trial 
on February 20, 1967, but he had suddenly gone out of town 
on state business and was still not available. So rather than 
obtaining Mr. Adams, Plaintiff brought in Mr. Rudelich, and 
thus the objection to his testimony was voiced. 
Should this court, however, consider his testimony, we 
call the court's attention to the fact that it goes only to the 
authority of a "negotiator" and not to others in the depart. 
ment who also acted on this matter of providing water for 
Defendants, including Mr. Hisatake and those with whom 
he dealt, such as Robert Wheadon, project engineer. Further-
more, Mr. Rudelich admitted that upon proper clearance, 
matters outside the right-of-way contract could be author-
ized, such as providing a gate, rip-rap on eroded areas, and 
the building of culvert at the state's expense (TR 69, 70). 
As a matter of fact these conditions and items were brought 
to the attention of Plaintiff as a part of the agreement with 
them, and as Mr. Hisatake admitted (TR-71), they are bind-
ing upon the state. And as Plaintiff has not performed on 
this part of their agreement and promise, we submit that 
the trial court should make these items and conditions a part 
of the finding and judgment in the case, which was not done. 
Therefore, just as the gate, rip-rap, and culvert items 
were outside of the contemplated contract with Defendants, 
and yet authorized, so also should the providing of water to 
17 
L)r:fendants be approved and authorized, which was in fact 
nwrlc a part of the contract by reason of the documents all 
being attached to the writing of February 2, 1960, and for 
o\'er six years never denied or objected to as being an obli-
gation of the state. 
It is further the contention of Defendants that the 
j 11 mishiny of water to them by Plaintiff wa1 in fact ap-
proved and authorized by reason of the writing and actions 
of lhe state and its agents over these several years, and even 
though the Federal Government may not participate in the 
cost for some technical reason, Plaintiff nevertheless, by all 
that is equitable and proper, should be bound, just as any 
private person or corporation would be under the circum-
stances. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that Plaintiff should 
be bound by its promises and agreements to furnish Defend-
ants with water or be required to pay just compensation for 
not doing so. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO DENY 
ITS AGREEMENT AND OBLIGATION TO FURNISH 
DEFENDANTS WITH WATER OR A WATERING 
SOURCE FOR LIVESTOCK. 
We have set out, what is believed to be undisputed facts 
and evidence of the Plaintiff's promises, agreements, ac-
tions, and efforts to provide water for Defendants over the 
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past six and one-half years, in our ST A TEMENT OF 
FACTS and in our POINT ONE, and so we refer the court 
to those facts and evidence therein presented as a part of 
our argument here. 
There should be no question that the state has power to 
contract and may be bound thereby. In 49 Am. Jur. 285, Sec. 
tion 74 the law seems clear: 
"The rights and responsibilities of a state under 
an ordinary business contract are, with few excep. 
tions, the same as those of individuals. Although it 
cannot be sued without its consent, the state when 
making a contract with an individual is liable for a 
breach of its agreement in like manner as an individ-
ual contractor." 
See also Campbell Bldg. Co. vs. State Road Commis-
sion, 95 Utah 242, 70 p 2nd 857. 
In the instant case, we submit, that had the state not 
been involved as a contracting party, there would be no ques-
tion of the obligation to construe the promises, writing, and 
actions involved herein as a contractual responsibility. Can 
the Plaintiff, then, after leading Defendants to believe it 
was actually going to furnish the source of water promised, 
and causing Defendants to spend considerable money and a 
great deal of time on these matters over the six year period 
suddenly renig on its agreements and promises and hide 
behind the state's immunity and claim lack of authority to so 
contract? We think not, and Plaintiff should be estopped 
from denying its obligation. 
In I ALR 2nd 346, Section 6 it refers to the question of 
estopple: 
r 
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"Assuming, however, the presence of all the 
prerequisites for the application of the doctrine of 
estopple as between individuals, under some circum-
stances the public or the United States or the state 
may be held estopped if an individual would have 
been estopped, as when acting in a proprietary or 
contractual capacity." 
The fact that Plaintiff was dealing with Defendants on 
the disposition of lands is evidence of this transaction being 
in a proprietary or contractual capacity. (See on this point 
-Stmnd vs. State, 16 Wash. 2nd 107, 132 p 2nd 1011). 
Again in 28 Am. Jur. 2nd 784, Section 123, it states: 
"Thus as a general rule, the doctrine of estopple 
will not be applied against the state in its govern-
mental, public, or sovereign capacity, unless its ap-
plication is necessary to prevent fraud or man if est 
injustice . .. " 
"A state may be held estopped when acting in a 
proprietary or contractual capacity." 
From the notes on page 34 7 of I ALR 2nd the case of 
State E.l-. 1'el. Upper Scioto Drainage and Conservancy Dist. 
cs. Tmcy, 123 Ohio St. 399, 181 NE 811 was cited wherein 
the court held : 
"That the state, by participating in a proceed-
ing through one of its departments acting within the 
scope of its departmental powers concerning lands 
toward which the state was exercising a proprietary 
function, was estopped to claim that the law under 
which the proceeding was brought was unconstitu-
tional or violative of a compact between the United 
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States and the state of Ohio. The court said ti 1 .1 t t t . . W .1,11 s a e can no more ea its pw and hal'e it than 
l . . Cfl)l 111• 01·c mary corporation or an individual." · ' 
In State e.r rel, Caldwell v. Laucoln SI reet R. Co .. 3
11 
Neb. 333, 114 NW 422, 118 NW 326, it was held: 
"The state, like an individual, may be estopped 
by its acts or ]aches, and should not be allowed to 
oust a corporation of its rights and franchises, whm 
for a long series of years it had stood silent and sec;
1 
the corporation expend large sums in the acquisition 
of property and improvements made thereon under a 
claimed right so to do under its charter." 
Also, in State e:r rel Washington Pacing Co. ii. Clausen, 
90 Wash. 450, 156 p. 554, the court stated: 
"Even where the government may not be barrea 
by mere ]aches, it may be estopped in pais by such 
actions with individuals as make it a question of 
honest dealing." 
We therefore submit that in order to prevent manife&t 
injustice, honest and fair dealing over a long series of years, 
wherein Defendants have had their land tied up and ren· 
dered useless from lack of a water source for their livestock, 
and fully expecting the water to be forthcoming through the 
acts and promises of the state, said Plaintiff should be es-
topped from denying its agreements and obligations tu 
Defendants. 
..... 
i 
I 
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POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE A 
FINDING AND JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S FUR-
NISHING A GATE, RIP-RAP AND A CULVERT ON 
DEFENDANTS' LAND. 
By reason of the highway project going through De-
fendants' land, Defendants suffered other problems, in addi-
tion to the taking of land and loss of access to their water. 
The Plaintiff, through its agents and counsel promised, and 
it was stipulated to in the trial court (TR-71), to provide 
Defendants with a 16 foot access gate across a 20 foot lane, 
with rip-rap to prevent erosion from spring run offs, and 
with a culvert to prevent erosion in a ditch. 
No finding or judgment was made as to these items by 
the court, and we respectfully submit that the trail court 
should be directed to make such a finding and judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the written promise of Alden S. Adams and 
the many other assurances and promises, and efforts to ac-
tually carry out those promises, on the part of Plaintiff, its 
agents and employees over a six year period of time to pro-
vide a watering source for Defendants, and the expending 
of e:onsiderable time and money in reliance thereon, and the 
further loss of use of some 3,000 acres of land for grazing 
of livestock over six years, we respectfully submit to this 
r:ourt that it would be a manifest injustice, unfair dealings, 
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and most inequitable to allow the Plaintiff, State Road C 
om. 
mission, to renig on its agreement and obligation to perfor 
m. 
We therefore respectfully petition this court to reverse 
the findings and judgment of the trial court, and make bind. 
ing upon Plaintiff the obligation to provide water or a 
watering source for Defendants for their liveRtock, or in 
the alternative, either to pay adequate compensation for not 
doing so, or to return Defendants' land to them from the 
original taking with an annulment of the entire proceedings. 
In addition Defendants submit that they are entitled to 
additional findings and judgment in regard to Plaintiff's 
furnishing a gate, rip-rap, and a culvert on Defendants' 
land. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SP AFFORD & YOUNG 
Suite 201, Dixon Building 
2188 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys .for Appellants 
